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ARGUMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION.
JB and Clark argue against indemnification, even though

the ABP Agreement contains all of the key terms considered of
importance by the Utah Supreme Court in Freund.

JB and Clark also

ignore the obvious and conclusive effect comparative negligence has
on the indemnification provisions and the clear need, under the
facts before the Court to further relax strict construction of this
rule.

For these reasons, the determination of the District Court

must be reversed.
II.

THE ABP AGREEMENT SHOWS CLEAR INTENT TO INDEMNIFY ABP FOR ITS
OWN NEGLIGENCE.
A.

Freund Does Not "Reconfinn" Strict Construction.
JB and Clark both hide behind the strict construction

rule in arguing

that ABP cannot be indemnified

for its own

negligence. Their arguments, however, ignore the pronouncements of
this

Court

and

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

regarding

strict

construction. This Court, in Pickhover v. Smith Management Corp.,
Ill

P.2d 664, 667-68 (Utah App. 1989) noted the judicial trend away

from strict construction.

Pickhover notes that the underpinnings

of the rule, accountability for tort damages, has been undermined
by the increased use of insurance contracts.
The following year, the Utah Supreme Court, in Freund v.
Utah Power & Licrht Company, 793 P.2d 362, 370-71 (Utah 1990), also
noted the "growing trend to relax some of the strictness of the
rule."

The Supreme Court also agreed to follow the trend in two

important respects.

First, the Court affirms that an indemnity

provision need not specifically mention a party's ovm negligence in
order to

indemnify a party for its own negligence.

Second, the

Court notes that "the objectives of the parties and the surrounding
facts and circumstances" must be considered when the agreement is
construed.
B.

Id.

The Freund Agreement And The ABP Agreement Contain The
Same Key Language,
Although JB and Clark argue that the ABP indemnity

provision is not at all similar to the Freund provision, they do so
by ignoring the key language of importance to the Freund Court.
Freund focuses on the phrases "any and all", "liabilities" and
"whatsoever nature" in concluding indemnification was provided.
Freund, 793 P.2d at 371. Freund also focuses on the fact that one
paragraph of the indemnity agreement provides less coverage,
thereby emphasizing the expansive language of the other, broader
paragraphs.

The ABP Agreement

importance to Freund.

contains the key language of

It also contains a narrow clause, which

highlights the broader indemnity provisions.
I

The ABP Agreement (paragraph 5(a)) provides for indemnity

from and against "any and all loss, damage, injury, liability and
claims...."

(R. 1077.) The ABP Agreement also provides indemnity

(paragraph 5(d)) against "any and all liability, claims, costs and
expenses of whatsoever nature...." Id.

2

(R. 1077.)

Like Freund. the ABP Agreement also contains an indemnity
provision for property damage which is narrower in scope, covering
property damage only "to the extent of the applicable insurance
which

sub-contractor

has

in

force

occurrence...•" (paragraph 5(b)).

at

the

time

of

the

Like Freund, this narrow clause

emphasizes the broader language of paragraphs 5 (a) and (d) and
demonstrates party intent to indemnify.
C.

JB And Clark's Attempts To Distincruish This Case From
Freund Are Not Persuasive,
Clark and JB's efforts to distinguish the present case

from Freund are without merit.

Clark and JB have raised several

issues which, when fully analyzed, do not raise serious questions
regarding indemnity.
Clark and JB first argue that the ABP Agreement is
different because Freund provides "full and complete" indemnity.
Although the ABP Agreement does not contain the words "full and
complete", this terminology was not of primary importance to the
Freund Court. Moreover, such terminology is not necessary in light
of comparative negligence.

Unlike Freund,! in the instant case,

there was only one type of indemnification that could be provided indemnification
comparative

for the negligence

negligence,

the

"full

and

of ABP.
complete"

In light of
language

surplusage.

*The plaintiff in Freund was injured in 1981 -- meaning
joint and several liability was still in effect. Freund, 793
P.2d 364.
3

is

JB

and

Clark

also

argue- that

the ABP

Agreement

is

distinguishable because the Freund agreement provides for indemnity
for liability arising out of the attachment of the cable equipment
to the poles.
the

same

However, the ABP Agreement contains language with

effect.

It

provides

for

indemnity

from

liability

"resulting directly or indirectly" from Clark's "performance of
this contract."

Clark's performance of the ABP Agreement included

contracting with and supervising JB to cut the hole in the floor
through which Mr. Healey fell. Therefore, the claims of negligence
against ABP resulted from Clark's performance of the ABP Agreement.
Finally, Clark argues that the ABP Agreement does not
indemnify ABP for its own negligence because it only indemnifies
for

liability

performance
negligence

resulting

directly

of the contract.2
did

result

from

or

indirectly

from

Clark's

As noted above, however, ABP's
Clark's

performance

of

the

ABP

Agreement.
D.

The ABP Agreement Is Not similar To The Indemnity
Provision In Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp.
JB and Clark both noted that ABP did not include Ericksen

v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993) in its analysis

2

Clark did not deny, as required by Rule 4-501(2)(b) of the
Code of Judicial Administration, paragraph 1 of ABP's statement
of uncontested facts, which states that J.B. Sheet Metal's
failure to secure the hole was a proximate cause of plaintiff's
injuries. J.B. Sheet Metal also effectively fails to dispute
this fact saying in its responsive memorandum "this is not a
statement of fact, but is instead a conclusion or argument."
(R. 1498) .
4

of indemnity agreements, Ericksen was not cited because it is not
on point.
Ericksen concerns the liability of a building inspector
employed by Salt Lake City Corporation who inadvertently injured a
construction worker when he dislodged a ladder supported by a
garage door.
Ericksen

is

Id. at 997.
considerably

The indemnification provision in
narrower

than

the

ABP

or

Freund

Agreements. Most notably, the Ericksen agreement does not contain
the word "liabilities" nor does the agreement cover liability
caused by a building inspector employed by the City. The Ericksen
indemnity agreement provided that the contractor would indemnify
the city for claims#"which may arise out of any act or failure to
act, work or other activity related in any way to the project, by
the

contractor,

employees.

its

agents,

subcontractors,

Id. at 998. (emphasis added.)

materialmen

or

Because the building

inspector was not employed by the contractor nor was he the
Contractor's "agent", "sub-contractor" or "material man" there was
no indemnity.

Id. at 998. Thus, both the facts and the indemnity

agreement preclude application of Ericksen to the facts before this
Court.
III. UTAH COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE LAW LEADS TO ONE INTERPRETATION OF
THE ABP AGREEMENT:
THAT IT INDEMNIFIES ABP FOR ITS OWN
NEGLIGENCE.
Four years before the ABP Agreement was executed, Utah
abandoned the concept of joint and several liability and replaced
it with comparative negligence.

JB and Clark argue that reliance
5

on comparative negligence impermissibly results in a "rewritten11
contract.

In fact, the opposite is true.

Ignoring the law in

effect when a contract is executed would result in a "rewritten"
contract.

This Court must interpret the ABP Agreement in light of

comparative negligence and specifically Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38.
Indeed, Freund requires an analysis of the "surrounding circumstances,"
including existing law, when interpreting an indemnity agreement.
A.

The Only Reasonable Interpretation Of The ABP Agreement
Is to Indemnify ABP For its Own Negligence,
Clark and JB argue that there are other meanings or

purposes for the indemnity provisions in the ABP Agreement. All of
the examples cited, however, are outside of the tort realm.
example, Clark and JB argue that the provisions
indemnify

for

nonperformance

of

contract

or

For

in question

administrative

sanctions.
Although the ABP Agreement does cover such contingencies,
it is clearly broader than that, because it specifically covers
claims for "injuries to or death of persons."

Given comparative

negligence, if the provision is to have any meaning in tort, it
must indemnify for ABP's negligence.
B.

Contracts Contain The Law In Effect At The Time Of
Execution And Should Be Construed According To Those
Laws,
In its initial memorandum, ABP cited Washington National

Insurance Co. v. Sherwood Associates, 795 P.2d 665 (Utah App.
1990) , for the proposition that all contracts contain the law in

6

effect at the time of their execution.
this by arguing three things.

Clark and JB respond to

First, they argue Washington

National raises a factual issue as to whether the parties to the
ABP Agreement considered the Liability Reform Act; Second,

they

argue Washington National is not on point because it involved
different facts; and Third, that this principle is too broad and
would cause courts to rewrite every contract in light of existing
laws.
Washington National notes several concepts regarding
contract interpretation which preclude these arguments. According
to Washington National, contracts implicitly contain laws existing
at the time of execution.
which

affect

enforcement,

their
and

Id. at 669.

validity,

courts

assume

Contracts embrace laws

construction,
that

discharge

and

"parties' contract

with

knowledge of their existing legal rights." Id. fn. 7.
In other words, this Court must begin with the premise
that the parties executed the ABP agreement with knowledge of
existing Utah law.

Interpreting the contract in light of this law

does not make the contract better than it is - - it only makes it as
good as it is supposed to be.
The attempt to distinguish Washington National on its
facts is also not persuasive because other courts have set out the
same basic principles.

See Fidelity Trust Co. v. State, 237 P.2d

1058 (Idaho 1951) (stating "It is axiomatic that extant law is
written into and made part of every written contract"); Robinson v.
7

Joint Sch. Dist. #150, 596 P.2d 436, 439 (Idaho 1979) (stating "It
appears to be the law in almost every state, if not all, that
existing law becomes part of a contract, just as though the
contract contains an express provision to that effect (unless a
contrary intent is disclosed). Citing 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 257
(1964) . Neel v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association, 675 P.2d
96, 102 (Mont. 1984) (stating that laws "existing at the date a
contract is executed are as much a part of the contract as if set
forth therein.")
Finally, as a corollary to these arguments, JB also
argues that it is not necessary to give all provisions of a
contract legal effect. Once again, JB ignores Utah law requiring,
if possible, that all provisions be given legal effect. See Stangl
v. Todd, 554 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1976) (stating "A construction giving
an instrument a legal effect to accomplish its purpose will be
adopted where reasonable, and between two possible constructions
that will be adopted which establishes a valid contract"); Hall v.
Schulte,

836

P.2d

989, 993

(Ariz. App. 1992)

(stating

"the

interpretation which is placed on an agreement should be one that
gives reasonable, lawful and effective meaning to all the terms.")
Citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(A) (1981).
C,

The Utah Supreme Court And Other Courts Recocmize The
Importance Of Comparative Nealiaence Law,
In Brown v. Boyer-Washington Blvd. Assoc. 856 P.2d 352,

355 (Utah 1993), the Supreme Court of Utah recognized how the

8

interpretation of an indemnity agreement would be affected by
comparative negligence law. The Brown court noted that agreements
to shield one from the negligence of another are not necessary
under comparative negligence.
Other
negligence.

courts

also

note

the

effect

of

comparative

In Bosse v. Litton Unit Handling Systems, Etc.. 646

F.2d 689, 693 (1st Cir. 1981), the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit held that, given comparative negligence, an
agreement would be pointless if it was not construed to indemnify
the indemnitee for its own negligence.

JB dismisses Bosse by

arguing that the indemnity provision was not similar to the
provisions in this case.

However, this does not affect the

analysis used by the Bosse Court nor does it undermine the
persuasiveness of the arguments relied on by the Court.3

3

In its principal brief, ABP also cited cases from other
jurisdictions with language similar to the language in the ABP
Agreement. JB dismisses the cases by arguing that other
jurisdictions may not apply strict construction. However, it is
clear that the court in Fischbach-Natkin v. Power Process Piping,
403 N.W.2d at 571, applied strict construction and still
concluded that the agreement provided indemnification for the
indemnitee's own negligence. The key language in Fischbach was
"all liability or claimed liability for injuries." Id. at 571.
Likewise, in Public Service Company v. United Cable. 829 P.2d
1280 (Colo. 1992) the indemnity language was very similar to the
language in the ABP Agreement and the court cited Freund for the
proposition that the use of the word "liabilities" was
significant in concluding that a party was indemnified for its
own negligence.
9

D.

ABP's Analysis Regarding The Effect Of Comparative
Negligence Is Not A New Argument On Appeal.
ABP filed two summary judgment memoranda in the lower

court, which both make the comparative negligence argument.4 Both
memoranda cite the comparative negligence statute and note that it
is determinative to the motions. ABP also specifically argued:
The Liability Reform Act protects A.B.P. from
third-party
liability
for
another's
negligence, including the negligence of J.B.
Sheet Metal, but A.B.P. contracted Clark
Mechanical
for
protection
against
all
liability, including its own negligence. The
purpose of the indemnity agreement was to
protect A.B.P. Enterprises from paying damages
resulting from Clark Mechanical or its subcontractor, J.B. Sheet Metals' actions or
omissions, and the purpose was to have that
protection regardless of whether the threat
was realized as a claim that A.B.P. was
negligent or in some other form.
(R. 1084.)
The argument regarding comparative negligence asserted
below by ABP was reasonably discernible and gave the trial court an
opportunity to make findings of law on that subject.
IV.

THIS COURT SHOULD FURTHER RELAX THE STRICT CONSTRUCTION RULE.
Agreements indemnifying a party for its own negligence

should no longer be strictly construed.

As this Court noted in

Pickhover. 771 P.2d at 667, the national trend is away from strict

4

ABP filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against JB (R. 1174)
and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Partial
Summary Judgment against Clark. (R. 1084) Both briefs made this
argument.
10

construction.
construction

The public policy considerations mandating strict
have

lost

most

of

their

relevance

over

Virtually all indemnity contracts now require insurance.

time.

The ABP

Agreement and the Subcontract Agreement required JB and Clark to
provide insurance coverage for the types of claims at issue in this
appeal.
The
Negligence

existence

of

insurance

statute obviate the need

and

Utah's

Comparative

for strict construction.

Because of these changes, the judicial protections required in an
earlier era have lost their importance.

This Court should follow

Freund in further relaxing the strict construction rule.
V.

THE ABP AGREEMENT DOES NOT INDEMNIFY FOR SOLE NEGLIGENCE AND
IS THEREFORE VALID.
One issue which was raised in the summary judgment

motions, but which was not resolved by the District Court, involves
the application of Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1. Although Rule 30(a) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provide this Court with
discretion to resolve this issue, it is not part of the order from
which this appeal was taken. This Court, therefore, has discretion
as to whether these issues should be addressed on appeal.
A.

The ABP Agreement Does Not Purport To Indemnify ABP For
Its Sole Negligence.
Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 13-8-1

states

that

construction

contracts "purporting to indemnify the promisee against liability
for damages arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage to
property

caused by or resulting
11

from sole negligence of the

promisee" are void.

(Emphasis added.) The ABP Agreement does not

purport to indemnify for sole negligence.

The ABP Agreement

premises all liability on claims resulting from "Sub-Contractor's
performance of this contract."

(R. 1077.)

Even in the abstract,

it would be virtually impossible to conceive of a factual setting
where ABP could be solely negligent for acts falling within Clark's
obligations under the contract.
When the actual facts before the Court are evaluated, it
is clear that ABP was not solely negligent.

In this case ABP

contracted with Clark to do a portion of the work on the project.
Clark in turn contracted with JB to do a portion of the work
allocated to Clark.

JB cut the hole in the floor which the

plaintiff fell through.5

ABP was clearly not solely negligent.

JB and Clark also alleged, in pleadings filed in the
lower court, that the accident was caused, in part, by Healey's
employer and his co-employees.

(R. 328, 347-48) .

JB and Clark

thus implicitly concur that ABP was not solely negligent.
B.

The ABP Agreement Should Not Be Interpreted In A Way That
Renders It Void.
As noted above, Stangl v. Todd. 554 P.2d at 1320, holds

that when confronted

with two possible

interpretations

of a

contract, a court should adopt the interpretation which would give

5

JB argues that there were no findings of negligence in this
case. However, JB does not deny that its employee cut the hole
in the floor and covered the hole with a piece of heating duct.
For purpose of this appeal, Clark has also clearly admitted the
negligence of JB. See footnote 2.
12

the contract effect.6

As it is reasonable to interpret the ABP

Agreement as not indemnifying for sole negligence, this Court
should do so. Clark and JB argue that this principle is too broad
and would result in rewriting void contracts to make them valid.
In this case, however, it would be more than reasonable to
interpret the limiting language cited above as excluding indemnity
for ABP's sole negligence and would not entail rewriting or even
stretching the agreement.
C.

This Court's Ruling In Jacobsen Construction Company v.
Blaine Supports ABP's Reading Of The Contract.
Clark and JB argue that Jacobsen Construction Company v.

Blaine Construction Co., 225 U.A.R. 20 (Utah 1993), Petition for
Cert, filed, Jacobsen Construction Co. v. Blaine Construction Co.,
230 U.A.R. 46 (Utah 1994) is on point and supports their argument
that the ABP contract purports to indemnify ABP for its sole
negligence.

However, in Jacobsen this Court specifically found

language in the agreement that purported to indemnify for sole
passive negligence. This Court reasoned that because the agreement

6

A related legal concept is expressed in Section 184(2) of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which discusses partial
enforceability of provisions which are void on public policy
grounds. The Restatement requires enforcement to the extent the
provision is non-violative of public policy. The restatement
rule is now the majority position. Data Management, Inc. v.
Greene, 757 P.2d 62, 64 (Alaska 1988). The first part of the
rule was adopted by this court in Nielson v. Nielson, 780 P.2d
1264, 1270 (Utah App. 1989). The second part of the rule has
also been widely adopted in the Western states. See Hopper v.
All Pet Animal Clinic Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 546 (Wyo. 1983); Data
Management. 757 P.2d at 64.
13

specifically excluded indemnity for sole active negligence, it
purported to indemnify for sole passive negligence.

The ABP

Agreement, however, is silent on the specific issue of sole
negligence and, therefore, indemnity for sole negligence cannot be
inferred from a specific provision in the ABP Agreement as it was
in Jacobsen.

On the contrary, the implication from the phrase

"resulting directly or indirectly from [Clark's] performance of the
contract" is that ABP is not indemnified for sole negligence.
VI.

JB MUST INDEMNIFY ABP BECAUSE ABP IS A THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY
OF JB'S SUB-CONTRACT WITH CLARK.
The JB Agreement references the ABP Agreement and in the

JB Agreement, JB specifically agreed to assume toward Clark all
obligations and responsibility that Clark assumed towards the
owner.

In

this

case,

the

owner

is ABP

(a subsidiary

of

WordPerfect). ABP is a third-party beneficiary of the JB Agreement
and JB is bound by the indemnity provisions in the ABP Agreement.
In Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt, Inc. v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382
(Utah 1989), the Supreme Court of Utah held that the intention to
create "intended beneficiary" rights "is to be determined from the
terms of the contract as well as the surrounding
circumstances."

facts and

JB read and signed the agreement to be bound by

the terms of the ABP Agreement and is therefore bound by the terms
of the ABP Agreement and must indemnify ABP in accordance with the
indemnity provisions.
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VII. THE ABP AGREEMENT AND THE JB AGREEMENT WERE NEGOTIATED AT
ARM'S LENGTH.
JB argues that the agreements between the parties may not
have been negotiated at arm's length and therefore may be void. To
support this, J.B. states that sub-contractors are "required to
enter

into

contractor."

the

contracts

prepared

by

the

owner

or general

There is absolutely no evidence in the record to

suggest that there was unequal bargaining power or that JB was
coerced.

JB does not even attempt to explain its contention that

the negotiations were conducted at less than arm's length, but
simply states without proof that agreements between contractors and
sub-contractors are generally not arm's length agreements.

This

does not justify invalidating the agreements.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, ABP respectfully requests that
this Court overrule the District Court's determination that ABP is
not entitled to indemnity and rule as a matter of law that the ABP
Agreement clearly manifests the parties' intent that ABP is to be
indemnified for its own negligence.

The Court should also rule

that the indemnity provision is not void under Utah Code Ann. § 138-1.
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13-8-1. Construction industry — Agreements to
indemnify.
A covenant, promise, agreement or understanding
in, or in connection with or collateral to, a contract or
agreement relative to the construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of a building, structure, highway, appurtenance and appliance, including moving,
demolition and excavating connected therewith, purporting to indemnify the promisee against liability
for damages arising out of bodily injury to persons or
damage to property caused by or resulting from the
sole negligence of the promisee, his agents or employees, or indemnitee, is against public policy and is
void and unenforceable.
This act will not be construed to affect or impair
the obligations of contracts or agreements, which are
in existence at the time the act becomes effective.
1969

78-27-38. Comparative negligence.
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not
alone bar recovery by t h a t person. He may recover
from any defendant or group of defendants whose
fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in
excess of the proportion of fault attributable to that
defendant.
1986

